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WILI.s--CONSTR.UCTION-LAPSE-"HEIRs" AS SuBSTITUTIONARY.-Testator in his will bequeathed one half of his estate "share and share alike" to his
three brothers, naming them, "being to each a one-third part thereof, to them
and their heirs forever." Two of the brothers were to testator's knowledge
dead at the time he made his will, and the third brother predeceased the testator.
In proceedings brought for a construction of the will, held, that the residuary
legacies to the brothers did not lapse, but the legacies vested in the respective
heirs of deceased brothers. In re Britfs Estate, (Wis. 1946) 23 N.W. (2d)
498.
At common law a legacy or devise lapses if the legatee or devisee dies during
the lifetime of the testator, and the property passes into the residue or descends
to the testator's heirs under the rules of intestate distribution.1 Lapse statutes
have been passed in most states which change the common law doctrine in respect to certain beneficiaries. 2 In the absence of an applicable statute, however,
the testator may prevent a lapse by manifesting an intention in his will to make
a gift in substitution.8 This is in accord with the universally accepted doctrine
that when the intention of the testator can be ascertained, the court will enforce
that intention unless forbidden by some positive rule of law. 4 As in the principal
case, when the testator uses traditional words of limitation such as "to A, his
heirs and assigns," or "to A and his heirs forever," the court must determine
what is sufficient manifestation of. the testator's intention to avoid a lapse. In
this determination, the courts are guided by certain definite criteria. It is generally held that the use of the conjunction "or" in the phrase "or his heirs,"
following a devise or legacy to a named beneficiary, furnishes an alternative or
substitutionary provision, and the heirs will take under the will when the
legatee or devisee predeceases the testator. 5 However, a devise or legacy to
A "and his heirs" or to A "his heirs and assigns" will lapse upon the death of the
beneficiary during the testator's lifetime,6 unless the context of the will indicates
an intent to effect a substitutionary gift.7 The reason consistently advanced for
this canon of construction is that the words "heirs, assigns, etc.," although no
longer required under statutes to pass a fee simple estate, are words of limita1 Roon, WILLS, 2d ed., § 666 (1926); Brett v. Rigden, I Plowd. 340, 75 Eng.
Rep. 516 (1568); Camden Trust Co. v. Wolfe, 131 N.J. Eq. 437, 25 A. (2d) 915
(1942).
2
4 PAGE, WILLS, lifetime ed., § 1422 (1941).
8
Palmer v. French, 326 Mo. 710, 32 S.W. (2d) 591 (1930); Brill v.
Green, 316 Ill. 583, 147 N.E. 446 (1925). Testator's intention must be to appoint
a substitutional beneficiary who is living at the testator's death.
4
Jones v. Holloway, 183 Md. 40, 36 A. (2d) 551 (1944); Magill v. Magill,
317 Mass. 89, 56 N.E. (2d) 892 (1_944).
5
128 A.L.R. 94 at IOI (1940). See note in 16 TEX. L. REv. 607 (1938),
where it is said that the rule is well established that courts may construe "and" as "or,"
or "or" as "and" to give effect to testator's intentions.
6
78 A.L.R. 992 (1932); Camden Trust Co. v. Wolfe, 131 N.J. Eq. 437, 25
A. (2d) 915 (1942); In re Spier's Estate, 224 Mich. 658, 195 N.W. 430 (1923);
Lawrence Nat. Bank v. Smoot, 145 Kan. 189, 64 P. (2d) 22 (1937).
7
See footnotes 10-12, infra.
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RECENT DECISIONS

tion indicating the nature of the estate which is given and not the person to
whom it is given.8 The correlation of the word "assigns" with "heirs" is
usually held to add emphasis to a finding that the phrase "to them, their heirs
and assigns" is a phrase of limitation and not of purchase. 9 Some courts have
found that by his use of the word "heirs" the testator intended to make a substitutional gift when the will manifests a plan of equal distribution of testator's
estate among family groups,1° when at the time of executing the instrument or
adding a codicil thereto the testator knew that a devisee or legatee was dead,11
or when "heirs" is used in another part of the will as descriptive of the beneficiaries and not of the estate given.12 The Wisconsin court was led to a sub8 128 A.L.R. 94 (1940); 3 WOERNER, AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION,
3d ed., § 434 (1923); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Halsey, 136 N.J. Eq. u9, 40 A.
(2d) 645 (1945).
9
The use of the word "assigns" with "heirs" assumes that the legatee will survive,
for otherwise it would be impossible for him to assign his legacy. In re Minor's
Estate, 59 Cal. App. 616, 211 P. 807 (1922); In re Witte's Estate, 102 Pa. Super.
535, 157 A. 328 (1931).
10 In Dent v. Dent, II3 S.C. 416, l02 S.E. 715 (1919), the will divided
residue of testator's estate into three equal parts, and gave a share to each of testator's
two brothers, and children of a deceased brother "share and share alike."
In Plummer v. Shepherd, 94 Md. 466, 51 A. 173 (1902), the testator devised
realty to named brothers and their heirs, and to the heirs of certain deceased brothers,
"share and share alike."
In re Estate of Hoermann, 234 Wis. 130, 290 N.W. 608 (1940), testator bequeathed his residuary estate to five daughters and four sons, by name, "to have and to
hold the same, unto them, share and share alike, and to their respective heirs and
assigns forever."
In Bond's Appeal, 31 Conn. 183 (1862), the will gave to the testator's children "and their heirs respectively'' to be divided in equal shares among them his estate remaining upon decease or marriage of his widow.
That courts find no substitutionary intention in these words, see In re Minor's
Estate, 59 Cal. App. 616, 2II P. 807 (1922), "their heirs and assigns respectively";
Daboll v. Field, 9 R.I. 266 ( 1869), "equally between them, share and share alike,
and to their respective heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns"; In re Gosden's
Will, 158 Misc. 99, 285 N.Y.S. 309 (1936), "in equal shares [to three nephews of
testator], their heirs and assigns."
11 Testator devised land to his son, William Davis, "to him and his heirs forever." William died and testator added a codicil to his will in which he stated
the death of William, who had been appointed his executor, and appointed another
son as executor, "to above mentioned will"; held, the heirs of William take under
the will lands devised to William. Davis's Heirs v. Taul, 6 Dana (36 Ky.) 51 (1837).
Testator, knowing that two of his three sisters were dead at the time of making
his will, made a bequest to his "brothers and sisters and their heirs"; held, that the
heirs of predeceased sisters took shares respectively bequeathed to them. Huntress v.
Place, 137 Mass. 409 (1884). But see Adams v. Jones, 176 Mass. 185, 57 N.E. 362
(1900).
I
,
12
In Hawn v. Banks, Edw. Ch. (N.Y.) 664 (1846), a clause in the will stated:
"I give and bequeath to my niece Mary Phelan and to her heirs the sum of $6000."
A previous clause had said: "I give to my sister and to her heirs ( excepting her
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stitutionary construction of the words "to them and their heirs forever" because
of the presence in the will of: the distributive phrase "share and share alike";
the scheme unfolded of an equal division of the testator's residuary estate between his own relatives and relatives of his wife; the fact that two of the
residuary legatees were to testator's knowledge dead at the time he executed the
will, and the presumption of .the law against an intended intestacy of one who
executes a testamentary instrument. It is well-known that the rules of lapse
frequently operate to thwart the testator's desires in the distribution of his estate.18
In view of the ambiguous character of the word "heirs" in conjunction with
named legatees, and the court's desire to effectuate the intention of the
testator whenever it is possible by reasonable interpretation of the entire instrument, the decision in the principal case appears to be both justifiable and com,mendable.
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daughter Mary Jane Wilcox and descendents of said daughter). the sum of $7000."
When Mary Phelan predeceased testatrix, the court held ,that the children of Mary
Phelan took her legacy under the will.
Testator devised to his niece "and her heirs" the residium of his estate. A previous portion of the will read, "To my brother Thomas's heirs at law I bequeath one
hundred dollars." The court held that when testator's niece predeceased him, the
niece's children took under the will. Wettach v. Horn, 201 Pa. 201, 50 A: 1001
(1902).
.
In Barnwell's Estate, 29 Pa. Dist. R. 317 [affirmed in 269 Pa. 443, II2 A. 535
(1921)] a gift to legatee "and to her heirs and assigns" was held to be substitutionary,
because in a later gift, ·the testator declared that it was "not to her [legatee's] heirs
and assigns."
18
4 PAGE, WILLS, lifetime ed., § 1430 (1941).

